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Quantum data locking is a uniquely quantum phenomenon that allows a relatively short key of constant size
to (un)lock an arbitrarily long message encoded in a quantum state, in such a way that an eavesdropper who
measures the state but does not know the key has essentially no information about the message. The application
of quantum data locking in cryptography would allow one to overcome the limitations of the one-time pad
encryption, which requires the key to have the same length as the message. However, it is known that the strength
of quantum data locking is also its Achilles heel, as the leakage of a few bits of the key or the message may in
principle allow the eavesdropper to unlock a disproportionate amount of information. In this paper we show that
there exist quantum data locking schemes that can be made robust against information leakage by increasing the
length of the key by a proportionate amount. This implies that a constant size key can still lock an arbitrarily long
message as long as a fraction of it remains secret to the eavesdropper. Moreover, we greatly simplify the structure
of the protocol by proving that phase modulation suffices to generate strong locking schemes, paving the way to
optical experimental realizations. Also, we show that successful data locking protocols can be constructed using
random code words, which very well could be helpful in discovering random codes for data locking over noisy
quantum channels.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.90.022326 PACS number(s): 03.67.Dd, 03.65.−w, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum data locking (QDL) is a uniquely quantum
protocol that provides one of the strongest violations of
classical information theory in the quantum setting [1]. In
QDL the knowledge of a relatively short key of constant size
allows one to (un)lock an arbitrarily long message encoded in
a quantum system. Otherwise, without knowledge of the key,
only a negligible amount of information about the message can
be accessed [2–6]. Such an exponential disproportion between
the length of the key and that of the message is impossible
in classical information theory, according to which the bits of
secret key should be at least as many as the bits of encrypted
information [7]. Although cryptographic applications may
seem natural, it was recognized early that the security provided
by QDL is in general not robust under the leakage of a small
fraction of the key or the message. Indeed, as a relatively
short key is sufficient to lock a much longer message, it may
very well happen that the leakage to the eavesdropper of a
few bits is sufficient to unlock a disproportionate amount
of information. Here we analyze this issue and show that
there exist QDL schemes that can be made resilient against
information leakage at the cost of increasing the length of
the secret key by a proportional amount. We show that to
protect QDL from the leakage of n bits of the key or the
message, it is sufficient to add an overhead of about n bits to the
secret key.
The security of QDL is based on the accessible information
criterion. It is well known that such a criterion does not
guarantee composable security [8]. That is, security is in
general not granted if QDL is used as a subroutine of
another protocol. To avoid this problem, one should make
an assumption on Eve’s technological capability, and require
that the message exchanged by QDL is not used for the next
protocol until Eve’s quantum memory expires. For instance,
composable security is granted if the eavesdropper has no
quantum memory and is hence forced to measure her share of
the quantum system as soon as she obtains it. Such additional
assumptions make the accessible information criterion weaker
than the commonly accepted security criterion for quantum
private communication [8], which is instead related to the
Holevo information. Interestingly enough, a large gap exists
between these two security criteria that may allow for high
rate QDL through quantum channels with poor privacy [9,10].
As a matter of fact, explicit examples of channels with low or
even zero privacy that allow for QDL at high rates have been
recently provided [11,12]. It is hence of fundamental interest
to seek a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of QDL,
especially in the presence of noise.
A number of QDL methods exist. In some of the best
known, the code words are created by applying uniformly
distributed random unitary operations to the vectors of a
given orthonormal basis [2,3,5,6]. The role of the random
unitaries is to scramble the code words in such a way
that an eavesdropper has essentially no information about
the message. The crucial feature of strong QDL schemes
is that the number of scrambling unitaries is much smaller
(in fact exponentially smaller) than the number of different
messages [13]. Although a scheme that can be implemented
efficiently on a quantum computer exists [5], the realization of
QDL with currently available technologies still presents severe
experimental difficulties. Moreover, all known QDL protocols
are defined for a noiseless quantum system. Hence, a problem
of fundamental importance is to design protocols capable of
performing QDL through noisy quantum channels. (Explicit
protocols for QDL through noisy channels have been recently
introduced in [12].)
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Here we present two QDL protocols based on random phase
shifts. The first one is based on random vectors (instead of
random bases) of the form [17]
|ψ〉 = 1√
d
d∑
ω=1
eiθ(ω)|ω〉, (1)
where {|ω〉}ω=1,...,d is a given orthonormal basis in a d-
dimensional Hilbert space, and eiθ(ω) are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random phases with zero mean,
E[eiθ(ω)] = 0. Even the choice eiθ(ω) = (−1)b(ω) is sufficient,
where b(ω) are random binary variables. We show that
codewords sampled from this “phase ensemble” of vectors
suffice to build strong QDL schemes. It is worth noticing that,
compared to previously known QDL protocols that require the
preparation of uniform (Haar distributed) basis vectors, our
scheme greatly simplifies the structure of codewords for QDL
and represents a major simplification for optical experimental
implementations.
Moreover, the expansion of the set of QDL codewords given
in this paper paves the way to the application of random coding
techniques to lock classical information into noisy quantum
channels [9,10], which requires the codewords used to hide
information to coincide with the codewords used to protect
information from noise. Codewords randomly selected from
an ensemble that attains the coherent information bound suffice
to protect information from noise [20–25]. This paper shows
that such codewords also suffice to keep information secure
from an eavesdropper.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Sec. II we describe a
QDL protocol where the codewords are obtained by applying
a random phase modulation. Section III provides a sketch of
the proof of the QDL property of our protocol, while details are
provided in Appendix A. Then, Sec. IV proves the robustness
of QDL to loss of information to the eavesdropper. Section V
discusses possible applications and experimental realizations
of our protocol in quantum optics. Finally, conclusions are
presented in Sec. VI.
II. QUANTUM DATA LOCKING FROM
PHASE MODULATION
In a typical QDL protocol, the legitimate parties, Alice
and Bob, publicly agree on a set of n = MK codewords in
a d-dimensional quantum system. From this set, they then
use a short shared private key of log K bits to select a set of
M codewords that they will use for sending information. If
an eavesdropper Eve does not know the private key, then the
number of bits—as quantified by the accessible information
Iacc, which is defined as the maximum mutual information
between the message and Eve’s measurement result—that she
can obtain about the message by intercepting and measuring
the state sent by Alice is essentially equal to zero for certain
choices of codewords.
We consider here two QDL protocols where Alice and
Bob are able to communicate via a d-dimensional noiseless
quantum channel. In the first QDL protocol, to encrypt a
message m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, Alice prepares one of the vectors
|ψmk〉 = 1√
d
d∑
ω=1
eiθmk (ω)|ω〉, (2)
where the value of k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is determined by the secret
key, and the vectors are sampled i.i.d. from the phase ensemble
defined above.
We require that Bob, knowing the key, is able to decode
with a probability of success close to 1. That is, for any k there
exists a positive operator-valued measurement (POVM) with
elements {(k)m } such that
p¯succ = 1
M
M∑
m=1
Tr
(
(k)m |ψmk〉〈ψmk|
)
 1 − . (3)
On the other hand, we require that if Eve intercepts and
measures the state |ψmk〉, then she will only be able to access
a negligible amount of information about the message m,
as quantified by the accessible information Iacc. We require
that [26]
Iacc  δ log M. (4)
Furthermore, for a key-efficient QDL scheme we demand that
K  M . In particular, we require that logK = O(log log M)
and that δ → 0 as K increases.
Here we show that a set of MK codewords randomly
selected from the phase ensemble will define a QDL protocol
with probability arbitrarily close to 1 for d large enough. To
show that, we make repeated applications of the following
bound on the largest and smallest eigenvalues of a random
matrix.
Theorem 1 [29]. Consider a d×n matrix W , whose entries
are independent and identically distributed random variables
with zero mean, variance σ 2, and finite fourth moment.
Define X = (1/n)WW †. Then almost surely as d → ∞,
the largest eigenvalue of X→ (1 + √y)2σ 2, where y =
d/n. In addition, when d  n, the smallest eigenvalue of
X → (1 − √y)2σ 2.
To apply this theorem to our case, let
W =
n∑
j=1
|ψj 〉〈ej |, (5)
where |ψj 〉 are n random vectors from the phase ensemble,
and the set {|ej 〉} is an orthonormal basis for an auxiliary
n-dimensional Hilbert space. Notice that the elements of W
are just the components of the randomly selected codewords
|ψj 〉 in the basis {|ω〉}ω=1,...,d . We have
X = 1
n
WW † = 1
n
n∑
j=1
|ψj 〉〈ψj |, (6)
and for the phase ensemble σ 2 = 1/d.
For finite d, we use another result from random matrix
theory.
Theorem 2 [30]. The probability that the largest eigenvalue
of X is larger than [(1 + √y)2 + δ]σ 2 is no greater than
C exp (−dδ3/2/C), where C is a constant. Similarly, if d <
n, the probability that the smallest eigenvalue is less than
[(1 − √y)2 − δ]σ 2 is less than C/(1 − √y) exp (−dδ3/2/C).
This theorem states that the probability that the bounds of
Theorem 1 are violated by more than δ vanishes exponentially
with d and δ.
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First of all, using these results, we can easily show that for
M  d Bob’s average probability of successful decoding is
p¯succ  1 − 2
√
M/d. To see that, assume that Bob applies the
“pretty good measurement” POVM with elements
(k)m = 	−1/2k |ψmk〉〈ψmk|	−1/2k , (7)
where
	k =
M∑
m=1
|ψmk〉〈ψmk|. (8)
Then we have, assuming δ  1,
p¯succ = 1
M
M∑
m=1
∣∣〈ψmk|	−1/2k |ψmk〉∣∣2 (9)
 d
M
[(
1 +
√
d
M
)2
+ δ
]−1
(10)
	 1 − 2
√
M
d
, (11)
where in (10) we have applied Theorems 1 and 2 to bound
	
−1/2
k 
√
d
M
[(
1 +
√
d
M
)2
+ δ
]−1/2
. (12)
On the other hand, the bound on Eve’s accessible information
is given by the following.
Theorem 3. Select MK i.i.d. random codewords |ψmk〉
(m = 1, . . . ,M and k = 1, . . . ,K) from the phase ensemble,
with MK 
 d and M  d. Then, for any δ > 0 and
K >
4
δ2
(
ln M + 2d
δM
ln
5
δ
)
, (13)
Eve’s accessible information satisfies
Iacc = O(δ log d) (14)
up to a probability
pfail  exp
[
−M
(
δ3K
4
− δ lnM − 2d
M
ln
5
δ
)]
(15)
that vanishes exponentially in M .
The sketch of the proof is provided in Sec. III, while details
are in Appendix A.
This theorem states that a set of MK random codewords
from the phase ensemble defines a strong QDL protocol. For
instance, if we put δ 	 1/ log M , then Iacc is smaller than
a constant with log K = O(log log M). Otherwise, for δ 
1/ log d, a secret key of size log K = O(log 1/δ) is sufficient
to guarantee Iacc = O(δ log d).
Quantum data locking from random unitaries
The second QDL protocol is defined by a set of random
unitaries of a particular form. We define the “phase ensemble”
of unitaries of the form
U =
d∑
ω=1
eiθ(ω)|ω〉〈ω|, (16)
where θ (ω) are i.i.d. random phases with E[eiθ(ω)] = 0. Given
the set of Fourier-transformed basis vectors
|m〉 = 1√
d
d∑
ω=1
ei2πmω/d |ω〉, (17)
for m = 1, . . . ,d, we define a set of dK codewords as
|ψmk〉 = Uk|m〉 = 1√
d
d∑
ω=1
ei2πmω/d+iθk (ω)|ω〉. (18)
Notice that for any k, codewords with different m are
mutually orthogonal. This implies that Bob can decode with
p¯succ = 1. Furthermore, each codeword in (17) has the same
distribution of the codewords selected from the phase ensemble
of vectors. The only difference is that |ψmk〉 and |ψm′k〉 are no
longer statistically independent. We thus obtain the following.
Theorem 4. Select K i.i.d. random unitaries Uk (k =
1, . . . ,K) from the phase ensemble and define the codewords
|ψmk〉 = Uk|m〉 (m = 1, . . . ,d). Then, for any δ > 0 and
K >
4
δ2
(
ln d + 2
δ
ln
5
δ
)
, (19)
Eve’s accessible information satisfies
Iacc = O(δ log d) (20)
up to a probability that vanishes exponentially in d.
The proof of this theorem can be obtained by a straight-
forward modification of that of Theorem 3 and is not reported
here.
It is worth noticing that these unitaries form an Abelian
group. It is hence somehow surprising that they yield strong
QDL properties.
III. SKETCH OF THE PROOF OF THEOREM 3
To compute Eve’s accessible information about the mes-
sage, we associate to the sender Alice a dummy M-
dimensional quantum system carrying the classical variable
m as a set of basis vectors {|m〉}m=1,...,M . We then suppose
that Eve intercepts the quantum system that has the encrypted
message. Since Eve does not know the secret key, the
correlations between Alice and Eve are described by the
following classical-quantum state:
ρAE = 1
M
M∑
m=1
|m〉〈m|A ⊗ 1
K
K∑
k=1
|ψmk〉〈ψmk|E, (21)
where the codewords |ψmk〉 are as in Eq. (2).
The accessible information is by definition the maximum
classical mutual information that can be achieved by local
measurements on Alice’s and Eve’s subsystems:
Iacc := Iacc(A; E)ρ
= max
MA,ME
H (X) + H (Y ) − H (X,Y ), (22)
whereMA : A → X,ME : E → Y are local measurements
with output variables X and Y , respectively, and H ( · ) denotes
the Shannon entropy of the measurement results.
The optimal measurement on Alice’s subsystem is obvi-
ously a projective measurement on the basis {|m〉}m=1,...,M .
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Concerning Eve’s measurement, it is sufficient to consider
only rank-one POVM, which are described by measurement
operators of the form {μj |φj 〉〈φj |}j=1...,J , with μj  0, and
satisfying the normalization condition
∑
j μj |φj 〉〈φj | = I. A
straightforward calculation then yields
Iacc = log M
− min
{μj |φj 〉〈φj |}
∑
j
μj
M
{
H [Q(φj )] − η
[
M∑
m=1
Qm(φj )
]}
,
(23)
where η(x) = −x log x, Q(φ) is the M-dimensional real
vector of non-negative components
Qm(φ) = 1
K
K∑
k=1
|〈φ|ψmk〉|2, (24)
and H [Q(φ)] = −∑Mm=1 Qm(φ) log Qm(φ) denotes the Shan-
non entropy of Q(φ).
We now apply a standard convexity argument, first used
in [1]. To do that, notice that assuming 〈φj |φj 〉 = 1, then∑
j μj/d = 1. This implies that the positive quantities μj/d
can be interpreted as probability weights. An upper bound on
the accessible information is then obtained by using the fact
that the average cannot exceed the maximum. We thus obtain
Iacc  log M − d
M
min
|φ〉
{
H [Q(φ)] − η
[
M∑
m=1
Qm(φ)
]}
.
(25)
Notice that now the maximization is no longer over a POVM
with elements {μj |φj 〉〈φj |} but over a single normalized
vector |φ〉.
Then the proof proceeds along three main conceptual steps:
(1) (See Appendix A1 for details.) Theorems 1 and 2 imply
that the random variable
∑M
m=1 Qm(φ) is close to M/d with
arbitrarily high probability for all vectors |φ〉 if d is large
enough and MK 
 d. In particular, the inequality
M∑
m=1
Qm(φ)  M
d
[(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ
]
(26)
applied to Eq. (25) yields
Iacc  α log d + η(α) − d
M
min
|φ〉
H [Q(φ)], (27)
where
α =
(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ. (28)
(2) (See Appendix A2 for details.) We show that for any
given |φ〉 and δ > 0,
η[Qm(φ)]  −1 − δ
d
log
(
1 − δ
d
)
(29)
for at least (1 − δ)M values of m (up to a probability
exponentially small in M). To do that, we show that there
is a negligible probability that Qm(φ) < (1 − δ)/d for more
than  = δM values of m. This result implies
H [Q(φ)]  M
d
(1 − 2δ) log d. (30)
(3) (See Appendix A3 for details.) Finally, to account for
the minimum over all unit vectors |φ〉, we introduce a discrete
setNδ of vectors with the property that for any |φ〉 there exists
|φi〉 ∈ Nδ such that
‖|φ〉〈φ| − |φi〉〈φi |‖1  δ. (31)
A set with this property is called an δ-net. The δ-net is used to
approximate the value of H [Q(φ)] up to an error of the order
of δ log d. We show that the inequality in (30) holds true with
high probability for all unit vectors in the δ-net.
In conclusion we obtain that for any δ > 0 Eve’s accessible
information satisfies
Iacc = O(δ log d), (32)
up to a probability which is exponentially small in d provided
K >
4
δ2
(
lnM + 2d
δM
ln
5
δ
)
. (33)
IV. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST INFORMATION LEAKAGE
We consider our protocols based on the phase ensemble of
random vectors to assess the robustness of QDL against the
leakage to Eve of part of the key or the message.
What happens if part of the key is known by Eve? For
example, suppose that Eve knows the first γ log K bits of the
secret key. Since the remaining (1 − γ ) log K are still secret
and random, it follows that we can still apply Theorem 3 and
Eve’s accessible information satisfies Iacc = O(δ log d) up to
a failure probability
p′fail  exp
[
−M
(
δ3K1−γ
4
− δ ln M − 2d
M
ln
5
δ
)]
. (34)
To assess the security of the QDL protocol under the leakage
of any fraction of the key, we have to take into account all
the possible subsets of γ log K bits. Each of these subsets
determines a corresponding subset of K1−γ values of the key
that remain secret to Eve. The number of ways in which these
values can be chosen is ( KK1−γ ). Applying the union bound we
can hence estimate from (34) the failure probability if any
fraction of γ log K bits leaks to Eve:
p′′fail 
(
K
K1−γ
)
p′fail  exp (K1−γ ln K)p′fail. (35)
Putting M/d = δ, this probability is exponentially small in M
under conditions
K1−γ >
4
δ2
(
ln M + 2
δ2
ln
5
δ
)
(36)
and
M > K1−γ lnK
(
δ3K1−γ
4
− δ lnM − 2
δ
ln
5
δ
)−1
. (37)
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In particular, for γ  1, the condition (36) can be replaced
by
K 
[
4
δ2
(
ln M + 2
δ2
ln
5
δ
)]1+γ
. (38)
Compared to (13), this condition implies that to make QDL
robust against the leakage of a fraction of γ log K bits of the
key, one simply needs to use a longer key of about (1 + γ )
log K bits. This result shows the existence of QDL schemes
that are robust to some loss of key.
What happens if a small fraction of n bits of the message
leaks to Eve? Suppose that Eve knows the first n bits of the
message, then one has to require that the key is sufficiently
long to lock the remaining log M − n bits of the message.
Since the codewords corresponding to the remaining part of
the message are still random, we have
Iacc = O(δ(log M − n)), (39)
up to a probability
p′fail  exp
{
−M2−n
[
δ3K
4
− δ(lnM − n) − 2n+1 d
M
ln
5
δ
]}
.
(40)
We apply again the union bound to estimate the failure
probability if any subset of n bits of the message leaks to
Eve:
p′′fail 
(
M
M2−n
)
p′fail  exp (M2−n ln M)p′fail (41)
 exp
{
−M2−n
[
δ3K
4
− ln M − δ(lnM − n)
− 2n+1 d
M
ln
5
δ
]}
. (42)
For any given n, the latter is exponentially small in M provided
K >
4
δ3
[
lnM + δ(ln M − n) + 2n+1 d
M
ln
5
δ
]
. (43)
Compared to (13), the last condition implies that to protect
QDL against the leakage of n bits of message, the key
should be enlarged by (log K) 	 n bits. This result shows
the existence of QDL schemes that are robust to plain-text
attack. A similar result can be obtained starting from other
QDL protocols, e.g., using the results of [6,14] based on the
min-entropy of the message.
V. APPLICATIONS
Towards quantum optical realizations. The phase ensemble
finds natural applications in the context of linear optics. For
instance, codewords belonging to the phase ensemble can be
realized by coherently splitting a photon over d modes (e.g.,
spatial, temporal, orbital angular momentum modes, etc.), then
by applying independent random phase shifts to each mode. If
information is encoded in the arrival time, the codewords can
be prepared by first applying a linear dispersion transformation
(see, e.g., [31]) and then random phase shifts at different times.
Concerning Bob decoding, in the case of QDL by the phase
ensemble of random unitaries (see Sec. II) it is sufficient to
apply the inverse transformation of the one applied by Alice
for encoding, then measure by photodetection. Notice that both
encoding and decoding operations can be realized by linear
passive optical elements and photodetection (for decoding) as
discussed in [9]. For the QDL based on random codewords
from the phase ensemble of vectors, Bob should in principle
decode by applying the pretty good measurement associated to
the set of QDL codewords, yet we do not know at the moment
an explicit construction.
A crucial requirement to realize our strong QDL protocols
in quantum optics is the ability to prepare and manipulate
quantum states of light in high dimension. The latter is the
goal of cutting edge research and several important milestones
have been achieved so far. See, for example, the recent report of
entanglement production between two photons in a 100×100-
dimensional Hilbert space [32].
Quantum data locking of noisy channels. Although the
phenomenon of QDL has been known for about ten years
now [1], only recently has it been reconsidered in the context
of noisy quantum channels [9,10]. In particular, the locking
capacity of a (noisy) quantum channel has been defined
in [10] as the maximum rate at which classical information
can be locked through N instances of the channel with the
assistance of a secret key shared by Alice and Bob which
grows sub-linearly in N . One can indeed define a weak and
a strong notion of locking capacity [10]. In the weak case
one assumes that Eve has access to the channel environment
(the output of the complementary channel), while in the strong
case one gives her access to the quantum system being input to
the noisy channel. Remarkably, there are examples of quantum
channels whose locking capacity is much larger than the
private capacity [11,12].
Our result on Eve’s accessible information applies directly
to the strong notion of locking capacity and can be extended
(by a simple application of a data processing inequality)
to the weak case. It hence remains to show how and at
which rate Bob can decode reliably. One way to do that
is by concatenating the QDL protocol with an error cor-
recting code [5,10,14]. Consider N 
 1 uses of a quantum
channel. If the quantum capacity of the channel is Q, then
one can lock information by choosing codewords in an
error correcting subspace of dimension d 	 2NQ. Another
approach may consist in designing a code which allows
for both QDL and error correction at the same time. Our
results indicate that random codes exist that can be applied
both for protecting against decoherence and for locking
classical information. (An explicit example has been recently
presented in [12].)
Locking a quantum memory. The QDL properties of the
phase ensemble can be used to lock information into a
quantum memory by applying a local random gauge field.
Consider an ideal (noiseless) semiclassical model for a
quantum memory consisting of d charged particles on a
ring of length L. For recording locked information in the
quantum memory, Alice applies a random i.i.d. magnetic
field to each particle and encodes a classical message
into one of the momentum eigenstates |p〉 = d−1/2 ∑dk=1
exp[i2πpx/L + i ∫ x0 A(x ′)dx ′|x〉], where A(x ′) is the vector
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potential in natural units. Notice that the application of the
random local fields corresponds to a random phase in the
momentum eigenstates. Then, a legitimate receiver who knows
the pattern of the magnetic field applied by Alice, can decode
the message by simply measuring the momentum. On the other
hand, Eve’s accessible information can be made negligibly
small by the QDL effect.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is well known that the security provided by QDL can
be severely hampered if even a small fraction of the key or
the message leaks to Eve. Here we show that, although this
is true in general, there exist QDL protocols that are instead
robust against the leakage of a small part of the message or
the key.
Until now, the codewords used in QDL have been restricted
to either Haar-distributed random bases [2,5,6] or approximate
mutually unbiased bases [5] (the role of mutually unbiased
bases being not yet completely understood [1,33]). This paper
showed that codewords modulated by random phase shifts
in a given basis suffice to guarantee strong and robust QDL
properties.
The fact that random phases suffice to ensure strong QDL
properties yields a major simplification for the experimental
realization of a QDL protocol. To produce states from the phase
ensemble, one only requires to generate d binary phase shifts,
instead of d2 random variables sampling Haar distribution of
unitary transformations. The phase ensemble is well adapted
for use in quantum optical channels, where a single photon may
be coherently split across different modes (e.g., path or time-
bin modes), to which i.i.d. random phase shifts are applied.
Alternatively, one can employ random unitaries from a set of
dispersive transformations [31]. To decode the message, the
legitimate receiver can first apply the inverse transformation
of the encoding one (both are linear passive transformations),
then measure by photodetection [9].
Our results suggest that random codes of the type
defined here can be used to perform direct QDL over noisy
quantum channels [9,10], which requires that the codewords
for QDL (encoding for security) also be appropriate
codewords for combating noise on the channel (encoding for
error correction). A straightforward way for doing that is to
concatenate the QDL protocol with a quantum error correcting
code [14], allowing for a rate of locked communication at least
equal to the quantum capacity of the channel. A fundamental
question is whether one can lock information at a rate higher
than the quantum (and private) capacity. Such a question has
indeed a positive answer, as shown by the results recently
presented in [11,12], providing examples of quantum channels
with low or zero privacy that instead allow for high rate QDL.
In particular, the phase ensemble was originally proposed in
[20] as a code for attaining the coherent information rate for
reliable quantum communication over a quantum channel
(see also [23–25]). The results proved here suggest that there
exist random codes defined from the phase ensemble that
allow for robust QDL over a noisy, lossy bosonic channel
at a rate equal to and possibly larger than the coherent
information.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We now proceed by describing in detail the three main steps
of the proof of Theorem 3 sketched in Sec. III.
1. Random matrix theory
We apply Theorems 1 and 2 with n = MK and
W =
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
|ψmk〉〈emk| (A1)
to obtain that
M∑
m=1
Qm(φ) 
[(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ
]
M
d
(A2)
for all unit vectors |φ〉, up to a probability exponentially small
in d and δ.
Since η(x) = −x log x is a monotonically increasing func-
tion near zero and M/d  1, Eq. (A2) yields
d
M
η
[
M∑
m=1
Qm(φ)
]
 η
[(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ
]
−
[(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ
]
log
M
d
,
(A3)
which, applied to (25), implies
Iacc  α log d + η(α) − d
M
min
|φ〉
H [Q(φ)], (A4)
where
α =
(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ. (A5)
2. Concentration of the Qm
For any given |φ〉 and δ > 0, we bound the probability that
there exist  = δM  M values of m, say m1,m2, . . . ,m,
such that
η
[
Qmi (φ)
]
< −1 − δ
d
log
(
1 − δ
d
)
(A6)
for all i = 1,2, . . . ,. This accounts for bounding the proba-
bility that Qm(φ) takes small values [smaller than (1 − δ)/d]
as well as the probability of large values [larger than
1 − η[(1 − δ)/d] + O(η[(1 − δ)/d])].
Bounding the probability of large Qm(φ). We first bound
the probability that Qm(φ) takes large values. We apply
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Theorems 1 and 2 with n = K and y = d/K . This yields
that the inequality
Qm(φ)  (1 +
√
d/K)2 + δ
d
(A7)
is satisfied for all unit vectors |φ〉, up to a probability
exponentially small in d and δ. In particular, for d 
 K and
δ  1 we obtain
Qm(φ)  1
K
. (A8)
Bounding the probability of small Qm(φ). To bound the
probability that Qm(φ) takes small values we apply the
following theorem.
Theorem 5 [34]. Given K i.i.d. positive random variables
Xk ∼ X such that E[X] and E[X2] are finite, then
Pr
{
E[X] − 1
K
K∑
k=1
Xk > τ
}
 exp
(
− Kτ
2
2E[X2]
)
. (A9)
Let us put
qmk(φ) = |〈φ|ψmk〉|2 = 1
d
∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
ω=1
φωe
−iθmk (ω)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (A10)
We have
E[qmk(φ)] = 1
d
∑
ω
|φω|2 = 1
d
, (A11)
and
E
[
q2mk(φ)
] = 1
d2
[
2
∑
ω,ω′
|φω|2|φω′ |2 −
∑
ω
|φω|4
]
(A12)
= 1
d2
[
2 −
∑
ω
|φω|4
]
. (A13)
By noticing that
∑
ω |φω|4  1/d, we obtain
E
[
q2mk(φ)
]
 1
d2
2d − 1
d
 2
d2
. (A14)
We can thus apply the tail bound in Theorem 5 with Xk =
qmk(φ) and τ = δ/d to obtain
Pr
{
Qm(φ) < 1 − δ
d
}
< exp
(
−Kδ
2
4
)
. (A15)
Having bounded the probability of small values of Qm(φ),
we now consider the probability that there exist  values of m
for which Qm(φ) < (1 − δ)/d. Taking into account all the (M )
choices of  values of m = 1, . . . ,M and applying the union
bound we obtain
Pr
{
∃m1, . . . ,m | ∀ j ,Qmj (φ) <
1 − δ
d
}

(
M

)
exp
(
−Kδ
2
4
)
(A16)
 exp
(
−Kδ
2
4
+  lnM
)
. (A17)
3. The δ-net
It remains to prove that (A17) holds true with high
probability for all unit vectors |φ〉. To show that we follow
a standard strategy and introduce an δ-net of vectors [2]. An
δ-net Nδ is a discrete set of |Nδ| vectors such that for any
vector |φ〉 there exists |φi〉 ∈ Nδ such that
‖|φ〉〈φ| − |φi〉〈φi |‖1  δ, (A18)
where ‖X‖1 = Tr|X| is the trace norm.
As discussed in [2], there exist δ-nets in a d-dimensional
Hilbert space with |Nδ|  (5/δ)2d . We can then apply the
union bound to estimate
Pr
{
∃|φi〉 ∈ Nδ,m1, . . . ,m | ∀ j ,Qmj (φi) <
1 − δ
d
}

(
5
δ
)2d
exp
[
−M
(
δ3K
4
− δ ln M
)]
(A19)
= exp
[
−M
(
δ3K
4
− δ ln M − 2d
M
ln
5
δ
)]
. (A20)
Notice that such a probability is exponentially small in M
provided that
K >
4
δ2
(
lnM + 2d
δM
ln
5
δ
)
. (A21)
It follows that with probability close to 1
η [Qm(φi)]  1 − δ
d
log d (A22)
for all |φi〉 ∈ Nδ and at least (1 − δ)M values of m. This result
in turn implies
H [Q(φi)]  M
d
(1 − δ)2 [log d − log (1 − δ)]
 M
d
(1 − δ)2 log d
 M
d
(1 − 2δ) log d. (A23)
It remains to estimate the error introduced by the δ-net. The
Fannes-Audenaert [35] inequality yields
|H [Q(φ)] − H [Q(φi)]|  ‖Q(φ) − Q(φi)‖12 log M
+h2
[‖Q(φ) − Q(φi)‖1
2
]
,
where ‖Q(φ) − Q(φi)‖1 =
∑
m |Qm(φ) − Qm(φi)| denotes
the vector trace norm and h2(x) = −x log x − (1 − x)
log (1 − x) is the binary entropy. It is shown in Appendix B
that Eq. (A18) implies
‖Q(φ) − Q(φi)‖1  2δM
d
, (A24)
up to a probability exponentially small in d and δ.
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4. Conclusion
Putting all this together, we obtain that if Eq. (A21) is
verified, then
Iacc  (α − 1 + 2δ) log d
+ η(α) + δM/d log M + h2(δM/d) (A25)
 (α − 1 + 3δ) log d + η(α) + h2(δ), (A26)
up to a probability exponentially small in M . Equation (A21)
implies
K >
1
δ3
d
M
, (A27)
which in turn yields
α − 1 < δ + 2δ3/2 + δ3. (A28)
In conclusion we have that for any δ and d large enough
there exist QDL protocols defined from the phase ensemble
such that
Iacc = O(δ log d), (A29)
with a preshared secret key of log K bits and
K >
4
δ2
(
ln M + 2d
δM
ln
5
δ
)
. (A30)
APPENDIX B: RELATION BETWEEN TRACE NORMS
To find an explicit relation between the trace norms
‖|φ〉〈φ| − |φi〉〈φi |‖1 and ‖Q(φ) − Q(φi)‖1, we introduce the
operators
m = d
M
[(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ
]−1 1
K
∑
k
|ψmk〉〈ψmk|. (B1)
Notice that the operators {m}m=1,...,M are positive, and
Theorems 1 and 2 imply that
∑
m m  I, up to a probability
exponentially small in d and δ. They hence define an
incomplete POVM.
For any unit vector |φ〉, the output of this incomplete POVM
is the subnormalized probability vector ˜Q(φ) with entries
˜Qm(φ) = 〈φ|m|φ〉 = d
M
[(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ
]−1
Qm(φ).
(B2)
Since an incomplete POVM does not increase the trace
distance, we have that if
‖|φ〉〈φ| − |φi〉〈φi |‖1  δ, (B3)
then
‖ ˜Q(φ) − ˜Q(φi)‖1  δ, (B4)
which in turn implies
‖Q(φ) − Q(φi)‖1  δM
d
[(
1 +
√
d
MK
)2
+ δ
]
. (B5)
For sufficiently small δ and d/(MK) this implies
‖Q(φ) − Q(φi)‖1  2δM
d
. (B6)
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